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Combating Trademark Squatting in China: New
Developments in Chinese Trademark Law and
Suggestions for the Future
By Sunny Chang*
Abstract: This Note explores the phenomenon of trademark squatting in China.
Several characteristics relating to the development of Chinese Trademark Law, such
as the first-to-file and multi-class application system, as well as the inherent
complexities of the Chinese language, contributed to creating an environment
amenable to trademark squatting. New developments in China, including a December
2011 opinion from the Supreme Court and a recent amendment to Chinese Trademark
Law, signal that the country is moving forward towards stronger protection of
intellectual property. However, these changes will likely not be enough to prevent
trademark squatters from targeting well-known foreign trademarks, since they still do
not address key factors that allow trademark squatting to persist. Until China
addresses these concerns, practitioners and businesses should be aware of the
difficulties of protecting trademarks in China, and they should take measures to
intelligently guard their intellectual property.

* J.D., 2014, Northwestern University School of Law; B.A., Biology, 2007, Amherst College. I would
like to thank my family for their love and support, as well as the numerous editors of the Northwestern
Journal of International Law and Business for their hard work in publishing this Note.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When Apple tried to introduce its wildly popular iPhone into one of
the biggest markets in the world, China, the company was in for an
unpleasant surprise.1 Though Apple had made the first application for the
iPhone trademark with the Chinese Trademark Office (CTMO) in 2002,
they only filed in a subclass for “computers and computer software.”2
Soon after, a Chinese company called Hanwang Technology registered the
iPhone mark under the proper subclass that included “phones and mobile
phones.”3 Apple fought in vain to reclaim the mark, and it ultimately lost
in its opposition at the CTMO as well as in an appeal to the Trade Mark
Review and Adjudication Board (TRAB).4 Apple reluctantly paid the
$3.65 million to Hanwang Technology for rights to the trademark.5

1
Peter Ollier, Apple’s Trade Mark Woes in China, 215 MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 47, 47 (Dec. 9,
2011).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.; Peter Ollier, iPad Loss Highlights Squatting Concerns, 215 MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 46, 46
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Hanwang Technology is an example of a “trademark squatter,” a term
defined as “a company or individual who registers another party’s brand
name as a trademark and then uses the trademark in connection with the
sale of counterfeit goods or in an effort to otherwise profit from the
goodwill of the genuine brand name owner.”6 Once the registration is
approved, the trademark squatter becomes the rightful owner of the
trademark and has rights that can prevent the original brand name owner
from using its mark, both in connection with the sale of products there and
in connection with the manufacture of products for export.7 Trademark
squatting in China is a big roadblock for multinational corporations that are
looking to enter the Chinese market, and it has affected a spectrum of wellknown businesses, including Apple,8 Chivas Regal,9 Land Rover,10
Ferrari,11 Remy Martin,12 and Hermès.13 Sports stars like Kobe Bryant14
and Michael Jordan have also been affected.15
(Dec. 9, 2011).
6
Patricia E. Campbell & Michael Pecht, The Emperor’s New Clothes: Intellectual Property
Protections in China, 7 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 69, 78 (2012).
7
Id.
8
Ollier, supra note 5.
9
In 2012, Chivas Regal failed in its opposition of a squatter’s application for the “Chivas Regal 88
& Device” mark on clothing. The court held that Chivas Regal was not well known in China at the time
of the squatter’s application. He Jing, Chivas Regal Lost Trademark Fight in China, ZY PARTNERS
LEGAL NEWSLETTER (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.zypartners.com/zjys/Blog/show_e.asp?newsid=97.
10
British car maker, Land Rover Group Ltd., fought for ten years against Chinese automaker,
Geely, to reclaim the mark “luhu,” or “陸虎” in traditional Chinese. 10 Year Trademark Saga Between
Gleely [sic] and Land Rover Comes to an End?, PATENT BRIC (May 2, 2011), http://patentbric.com/?p=133.
11
The Beijing First Intermediate Court held that Ferrari’s prancing horse design was not well
known in China, allowing a Chinese department store to register and use the mark in clothing. Jing Luo
& Shubha Ghosh, Protection and Enforcement of Well-Known Mark Rights in China: History, Theory
and Future, 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 119, 141–50 (2009).
12
E. Remy Martin & Co. has filed a judicial appeal with the Beijing First Intermediate People’s
Court after the Trademark Review and Adjudication Board denied its opposition against the trademark
application for “人头马,” or “Ren Tou Ma” (a word that is widely associated with Remy Martin’s XO
within China), in the computer category. He Jing & Gu Ting, Remy Martin and Chanel are Fighting
Hard with Trademark Pirates in China, ZY PARTNERS LEGAL NEWSLETTER (Oct. 21, 2011),
http://www.zypartners.com/zjys/Blog/show_e.asp?newsid=71.
13
Hermès, a luxury brand based in France, lost its trademark dispute in China against a menswear
company that had registered the name “爱玛仕” (Ai Ma Shi), after neglecting to register the Chinese
translation of Hermès, which is “爱马” (Ai Ma). The two marks contain very similar Chinese
characters with the same pronunciation. Ann Yan, China: Hermes and Chivas—The Disadvantages of
Not Being the First to File Applications for Trade Marks in China, MONDAQ (last updated Apr. 2, 2012),
http://www.mondaq.com/x/170806/Trademark/Hermes+and+Chivas+The+Disadvantages+of+Not+Being
+the+First+to+File+Applications+for+Trade+Marks+in+China.
14
The Trademark Review and Adjudication Board denied Nike’s opposition to a Chinese
individual who registered the name of Los Angeles Lakers star Kobe Bryant in Class 18, which covers
items such as handbags and wallets. Peter Leung, Kobe Bryant Fights for Chinese Trade Mark, 222
MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 31, 31 (July 18, 2012).
15
Id. (“Michael Jordan filed a lawsuit against Qiaodan Sportswear, which registered the Chinese
version of his name, (‘Qiaodan’).”).
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The significance of the Chinese market has increased exponentially in
recent years with the modernization of the Chinese economy. In 2011,
China had already overtaken Japan as the world’s second-biggest
economy.16 Although the United States’ economy is currently almost three
times the size of China’s economy, at its current rate of growth, analysts
see China replacing the United States as the world’s top economy in about
a decade.17 The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which
gathers IP statistics from ninety IP offices around the world, reported that
in 2009, the CTMO received a quarter of all trademark applications
worldwide.18 Even after adjustment for differences between single-class
and multi-class filing systems,19 China still had 2.3 times more trademarkfiling activities than the second highest country, the United States.20
With the increasing importance of the Chinese market in international
trade, protection of trademarks against trademark squatters is of much
interest to many foreign businesses entering China. This Note attempts to
illuminate the reasons why trademark squatting has proliferated in China as
well as examine recent developments in China’s Supreme Court. It also
concludes with a discussion of whether the new amendment to China
Trademark Law will actually allow trademark owners to combat squatters.
Part II traces the development of Chinese Trademark Law, beginning
with the pre-modern era and extending through post-Mao Zedong times, by
looking at both the modern development of trademark law and the external
and internal forces that pushed modernization forward. Part III examines
the current Chinese Trademark Law in further detail.
It focuses
specifically on those characteristics that create an environment in which
trademark squatting can more easily occur. Part IV discusses recent
developments in China in the form of Supreme Court opinions and an
upcoming amendment to trademark law. Part IV also discusses whether
these developments will be enough to battle trademark squatters. Finally,
in Part V, this Note ends with practical suggestions for practitioners
seeking to protect trademarks in China.

16
China Overtakes Japan as World’s Second-Biggest Economy, BBC NEWS (Feb. 14, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12427321.
17
Id. According to the World Bank, China’s $8.22 trillion economy is now the second largest in
the world, compared with the $15.68 trillion U.S. economy. Lee Kuan Yew, Once China Catches Up—
What Then?, FORBES (Sept. 17, 2013, 11:40 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/currentevents/2013/09/
17/once-china-catches-up-what-then/.
18
WIPO Releases Compilation of Recent IP Statistics, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (Sept. 20,
2011), http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2011/article_0021.html#_ftn1; WIPO IP Facts and
Figures 2011, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (2011), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/
freepublications/en/statistics/943/wipo_pub_943_2011.pdf.
19
In a single-class filing system, a trademark applicant can file one mark in one class per trademark
application. In a multi-class filing system, an applicant can file a mark in more than one class in one
application. See infra Part III.B.
20
WIPO Releases Compilation of Recent IP Statistics, supra note 18.
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF CHINESE TRADEMARK LAW
Despite the country’s long history, China’s modern system of
intellectual property law, including trademark law, is a relatively young
institution.21 Examining the development of Chinese Trademark Law as
well as the different forces that helped shape the law as it stands today
serves as a helpful backdrop to the subsequent discussion of what
characteristics of the law allow trademark squatting to persist.
A. Early Development from the Pre-Modern Era to the Cultural
Revolution
During its long and rich history of 5,000 years, China has consistently
been at the forefront of scientific discovery and technological invention.22
For example, it was the first to invent, among other things, “papermaking,
printing with movable types, gunpowder, and the compass.”23 The first
known trademarks have been traced back to the Northern Zhou Dynasty
(556–580 A.D.), when merchants began to use different marks to
distinguish their products and craftsmanship from others.24 Yet despite
such a long history of using trademarks, direct regulation and protection of
trademarks by the government has been a fairly recent development.25
China’s first formal trademark law, strongly influenced by foreigners that
had substantial control over China’s trade at the time, was enacted by the
Qing Dynasty government in 1904 but was never put into practice.26
The Republican-era governments that followed the end of the Qing
Dynasty enacted more comprehensive trademark laws, and in 1923,
Northern Chinese warlords established China’s first trademark office.27
Despite these developments, trademark protection in pre-1949 China “was
largely illusory,” and trademarks were frequently counterfeited in the
absence of official remedies.28
The mid-twentieth century brought the founding of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) and the establishment of the Chinese Communist
21

See Weiqiu Long, Intellectual Property in China, 31 ST. MARY’S L.J. 63, 67–71 (1999).
Jessica J. Zhou, Trademark Law & Enforcement in China: A Transnational Perspective, 20 WIS.
INT’L L.J. 415, 417 (2002).
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Geoffrey T. Willard, An Examination of China’s Emerging Intellectual Property Regime:
Historical Underpinnings, the Current System and Prospects for the Future, 6 IND. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 411, 413 (1996).
26
Zhou, supra note 22, at 418; JIANQIANG NIE & KEISUKE IIDA, THE ENFORCEMENT OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 179 (2006).
27
Willard, supra note 25, at 414.
28
Id. at 415.
22
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Party.29 The Cultural Revolution that followed brought developments in
intellectual property law to a grinding halt.30 Basing their new legal system
on the Soviet model, the PRC’s early intellectual property law system was
based on the idea that individual accomplishments belonged to all of society.31
Not surprisingly, “individual ownership of intellectual property . . . did not
fare well within this [ideological framework],” and trademark registration
as well as regulatory supervision of domestic trademarks nearly
disappeared.32
B. Transition to China’s Modern Trademark Law
It wasn’t “until the post-Mao Zedong era of the 1980s that China
began building a formal legal system.”33 With the recognition that a legal
structure that created a business environment more inviting to foreign
investors was essential for economic development,34 China began to
implement new regulations that improved protection of intellectual
property.35
The present legal system in China, including trademark law, was
founded on the Chinese Constitution promulgated in 1982 (1982
Constitution), which differed considerably from the first Constitution of
China, promulgated in 1954.36 On August 23, 1982, the Fifth National
People’s Congress of China adopted a trademark law, and within three
years, the State Council of China promulgated the Implementing
Regulations of the Trademark Law, which served to address specific
application of the laws.37 Essentially, this new law “made it possible for
individuals and institutions, in addition to enterprises, to apply for
trademark registration.”38 Furthermore, the new law authorized a private
right of action against infringing marks, though damages for infringement

29

Id. at 414–15.
Id. See generally LASZLO LADANY, LAW AND LEGALITY IN CHINA: THE TESTAMENT OF A
CHINA-WATCHER 72–78 (1992).
31
WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE 56–57 (1995).
32
Zhou, supra note 22, at 420–21.
33
Jessica C. Wong, The Challenges Multinational Corporations Face in Protecting Their WellKnown Trademarks in China, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 937, 941 (2006).
34
See KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA, FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM 243–59
(1995) (discussing the economic reforms undertaken during this period).
35
Zhou, supra note 22, at 416 (“China’s long-time inability to join the World Trade Organization
(WTO) had been largely attributable to political oppositions from the U.S. and Europe claiming, among
other things, that China could not provide adequate protection for intellectual property rights.”).
36
Long, supra note 21.
37
Id. at 67.
38
Zhou, supra note 22, at 426. For general commentary on the 1983 Trademark Law, see L. Mark
Wu-Ohlson, A Commentary on China’s New Patent and Trademark Laws, 6 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 86,
126 (1984).
30
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remained compensatory.39
Partly in response to criticism that China did not provide adequate
enforcement against infringing trademarks,40 the Standing Committee of
the Seventh National People’s Congress of China subsequently revised the
Trademark Law of 1982 on February 22, 1993.41 Corresponding with those
revisions, the State Council of China also revised the Implementing
Regulations of the Trademark Law of 1983, once each in 1988 and 1993.42
The amendments expanded the categories of actions that constituted acts of
infringements, as well as implemented rules that imposed higher ranges of
fines and criminal penalties.43
C. External and Internal Pressures Continue to Shape Chinese IP
Law
Both external and internal pressures have since pushed China forward
in the development of its current intellectual property laws.44 Externally,
the United States has been the most aggressive proponent pushing for
stronger intellectual property right enforcement in China, repeatedly
threatening the country with “economic sanctions, trade wars, non-renewal
of Most Favored Nation status, and opposition to entry into the World
Trade Organization.”45 Since 1979, with the first Sino-American bilateral
agreement, the Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of
America and the People’s Republic of China,46 China has relented under
U.S. pressure. The two countries signed bilateral agreements in 199247 and

39

Zhou, supra note 22, at 426.
William P. Alford, Don’t Stop Thinking About . . . Yesterday: Why There Was No Indigenous
Counterpart to Intellectual Property Law in Imperial China, 7 J. CHINESE L. 3, 5–6 (1993) (“[In] the
early 1990s, the United States government labeled both the PRC and the Republic of China (ROC) as
principal culprits in the infringement of billions of dollars of American intellectual property. In
consequence, the United States Trade Representative launched trade actions against both the PRC and
ROC, resulting, after bitter negotiations, in the conclusion by each of agreements in 1992 to revise their
intellectual property laws to meet American concerns.”).
41
Long, supra note 21, at 69.
42
Id.
43
See Hamideh Ramjerdi & Anthony D’Amato, The Intellectual Property Rights Laws of the
People’s Republic of China, 21 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 169, 177–78 (1995).
44
Luo & Ghosh, supra note 11, at 128–31. For a discussion on how intellectual property regimes
in developing countries go through phases according to internal and U.S. trade pressure, see Ruixue
Ran, Well-Known Trademark Protection in China: Before and After the TRIPS Amendments to China’s
Trademark Law, 19 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 231, 245 (2002).
45
Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the TwentyFirst Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 132–33 (2000).
46
Agreement on Trade Relations, July 7, 1979, U.S.-P.R.C, 31 U.S.T. 4651.
47
Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Property, Jan. 17, 1992, U.S.P.R.C, T.I.A.S. No. 12036.
40
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1995,48 in which China promised to increase protection of intellectual
property within its borders.49
International treaties and non-binding international standards were
also a key force in shaping China’s current intellectual property laws.50 To
demonstrate its commitment towards intellectual property protection to the
international community, China began signing treaties and joining IP rights
organizations such as the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
in 1980.51 In preparing to join the World Trade Organization (WTO),
which it did in December 2001, China undertook a complete overhaul of its
intellectual property law system, amending its copyright, patent, and
trademark laws.52 These “millennium amendments” shaped China’s
trademark laws to conform better to the TRIPS Agreement, such as by
strengthening protection of “well-known” marks, removing time limits for
challenging marks acquired by fraud or other unfair means, adding judicial
review of all trademark office administrative decisions, and strengthening
enforcement by allowing preliminary injunctions.53
However, to characterize the millennium amendments as China’s
passive response to external factors would not give a complete picture of
the forces behind the change, as the rapidly changing domestic conditions
also necessitated modernization of Chinese intellectual property law.54
Most significantly, with the emergence of a socialist market economy, the
notion of private profit became justifiable and the National People’s
Congress saw the need to remove outdated provisions from the “command
economy” that existed previously.55 Yet these developments proved to be
inadequate in providing protection against trademark squatters.
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE TRADEMARK LAW
THAT FOSTER TRADEMARK SQUATTING
How is it that despite these advancements in the modernization of

48

Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, Feb. 26, 1995, U.S.-P.R.C., 34 I.L.M. 881.
Luo & Ghosh, supra note 11, at 131.
50
Id.
51
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T.
1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3; Wong, supra note 33, at 941.
52
Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in PostWTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901, 908–14 (2006) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode
II)]. For the text of the amended trademark law, see Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangbiao Fa (中
华人民共和国商标法) [Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2001, effective Oct. 27, 2001) ST. COUNCIL GAZ., Nov.
20, 2001, available at http://english.ipr.gov.cn/lawsarticle/laws/lawsar/trademark/200608/233124_1.html
(last visited Nov. 20, 2012) [hereinafter PRC Trademark Law of 2001].
53
Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II), supra note 52, at 910–11.
54
Id. at 914.
55
Id. at 917–18.
49
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trademark law, trademark squatting still flourishes? This part examines
characteristics of Chinese Trademark Law that are relevant in creating an
environment that is amenable to trademark squatting: the first-to-file
system, single-class filing, the heightened requirements for well-known
status, and the language barrier.
A. First-to-File as Opposed to First-to-Use
China follows a first-to-file system for trademarks.56 Unlike the
United States, which requires, among other things, proof of use of a
trademark in commerce before allowing registration, the earliest applicant
in China need not show use in commerce.57 Article 29 of China’s
Trademark Law explains the procedure:
Where two or more applicants apply for the registration of
identical or similar trademarks for the same or similar goods, the
preliminary approval, after examination, and the publication shall
be made for the trademark which was first filed. Where
applications are filed on the same day, the preliminary approval,
after examination, and the publication shall be made for the
trademark which was the earliest used, and the applications of the
others shall be refused and their trademarks shall not be
published.58
The current Regulations for the Implementation of the Trademark Law
of the PRC further specify that if use was started on the same day or if
neither trademark is in use, all of the applicants must consult with each
other to submit an agreement to the Trademark Office.59 If an agreement is
not reached, the Trademark Office will draw lots to determine which
application to register.60 Although Article 31 of the Trademark Law states
that an application for the registration of a trademark shall not create any
prejudice to the prior right of another person nor should unfair means be
used to preemptively register the trademark of some reputation that another
person has used, “it is unclear precisely what this language means and the

56

PRC Trademark Law of 2001, supra note 52, art. 29; Campbell & Pecht, supra note 6, at 78.
U.S. trademark law specifies that the United States Patent and Trademark Office will not issue
trademark registration until the applicant files a verified statement that the mark is in use in commerce.
15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), (d) (2001); see also Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125
Stat. 284 (2011).
58
PRC Trademark Law of 2001,supra note 52, art. 29.
59
Regulation for the Implementation of the Trademark Law art. 19 (promulgated by State Council,
Aug. 3, 2002, effective Sept. 15, 2002), http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/lawsarticle/laws/lawsar/trademark/
200604/233111_1.html (China).
60
Id.
57
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extent to which it is enforced.”61
Thus, China’s system requires no evidence of prior use or ownership,
leaving registration of popular foreign marks open to third parties.62 This
has been, and will likely continue to be, an enormous impediment to
foreign companies entering China. An American company, by using a
mark that they themselves developed, may have its goods seized, be unable
to use its mark, and may even find itself as the defendant in a suit for
infringement because a squatter already registered the trademark.63
However, the first-to-file system cannot be seen as the sole reason for
the proliferation of trademark squatting in China, since most countries that
follow the civil law tradition base trademark rights on registration and
“give few if any rights to a prior unregistered trademark user.”64 The firstto-use system used in the United States is grounded in English common
law and prevails only in countries that follow the common law tradition,
such as Canada and Australia.65
B. Single-Class Filing as Opposed to Multi-Class Filing
Budweiser shoes? Mercedes toaster ovens? While neither Budweiser
nor Mercedes plan to place their names on shoes or kitchen appliances,
enterprising trademark squatters have already registered these brand names
for use on “everything from house wares to clothing sold in China.”66 This
is possible due to another difference from the trademark laws of the United
States: China requires single-class, as opposed to multi-class, trademark
applications.67
When filing trademark applications, most countries require that the
goods and services in the application be grouped in various classes under
the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of
the Registration of Marks (the Nice Classification).68 A product is divided
into classes according to its function, or if there is no apparent function,

61

PRC Trademark Law of 2001,supra note 52, art. 31; Campbell & Pecht, supra note 6, at 79.
Intellectual Property Rights, EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES BEIJING-CHINA, beijing.usembassychina.org.cn/iprtrade.html (last visited May 14, 2014).
63
Breann M. Hill, Achieving Protection of the Well-Known Mark in China: Is There a Lasting
Solution?, 34 U. DAYTON L. REV. 281, 288 (2009).
64
Jefferson Perkins, Fighting Foreign Trademark Piracy, 24 DCBA BRIEF 28, 29 (2011).
65
Id.
66
JEROEN LALLEMAND, SPECIAL REPORT TRADEMARKS IN CHINA: LAND OF OPPORTUNITY POSES
UNIQUE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RISKS FOR BRAND OWNERS 2 (Dec. 2011), available at
http://trademarks.thomsonreuters.com/sites/default/files/rsrc_assets/docs/china_special_report.pdf.
67
Single Class vs. Multi-Class Trademark Applications, INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N (last visited Nov.
21, 2012), http://www.inta.org/TrademarkBasics/FactSheets/Pages/SingleClassvsMulti-ClassTrademark
Applications.aspx.
68
Id.
62
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according to its material composition.69 Services are divided according to
the nature of the services performed.70 The current version of the Nice
Classification consists of thirty-four classes of goods and eleven classes of
services, and such classifications streamline and quicken the registration
process.71
The single-class filing system that China uses means that there is one
mark, one class per trademark application, in contrast to the multi-class
filing system used in the United States where an applicant can file a mark
in more than one class in one application.72 Thus in China, an applicant
must file a separate application for each class that they wish to protect their
trademarks. The only way to be fully protected in China is to repeat the
trademark application process dozens of times for China’s forty-five
trademark categories, each of which has multiple sub-categories.73 Unless
a corporation does so, a trademark squatter could snatch up one or more of
the remaining categories to sell products of their own or to attempt to sell
the category back to the corporation at an inflated price. The difficulties
that Apple faced because it registered its iPhone trademark in the wrong
subclass are a good illustration of the consequences of not being familiar
with the single-class filing system.74
C. It’s Hard to Be Well-Known in China
In addition to the systematic difficulties that overseas brands face due
to China’s first-to-file rule as well as the single-filing system, another
difficulty that arises in combating trademark squatters comes from the high
evidentiary requirements that trademark owners face in order to be deemed
famous in China, which would afford them the added protection of being a
“well-known” unregistered mark.75
Well-known marks are given extensive rights and privileges under
Chinese Trademark Law. The current Chinese Trademark Law provides
that if a well-known mark is registered in China, the owner of the mark can
exclude others from registering, reproducing, or translating the mark across
all categories of trademarks.76 Even if the mark is unregistered, the owner
69

Id.
Id.
71
Id.
72
Mary M. Squyres & Nanette Norton, Choice of Class in Which to File—Single or Multi-Class
Filing, in 1 TRADEMARK PRAC. THROUGHOUT THE WORLD § 4:14 (2012) (“As many countries change
their laws, they are moving away from this system in that it is more cumbersome for record-keeping
purposes, both for a docket and for number of files.”).
73
LALLEMAND, supra note 66.
74
See supra text accompanying notes 2–4.
75
Mary K. Alexander, Note, The Starbucks Decision of the Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s
Court: A Victory Limited to Lattes?, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 881, 894–95 (2008).
76
Luo & Ghosh, supra note 11, at 122–23.
70
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can prevent the mark’s use or registration in similar or identical categories
of goods in China so long as the mark is deemed well known.
The Chinese courts will consider the following factors in determining
whether a mark is well known:
(1) reputation of the mark to the relevant public; (2) time period
for the owner’s continued use of the mark; (3) consecutive time
period, extent and geographical area of advertisement of the
mark; (4) records of protection of the mark as a well-known
mark; and (5) any other factors relevant to the mark’s
reputation.77
The 2003 Provisions on the Determination and Protection on Well-Known
Trademarks describe these factors in greater detail and list what types of
evidence a trademark owner may submit to prove that its mark is well
known.78
In the past, Chinese Trademark Law was interpreted to require the
trademark in question to be famous inside of China.79 However, with the
amendment of the laws to consider the “relevant public,” as opposed to the
entire Chinese public, the test for well-known trademarks has shifted
slightly, but the requirements are still stringent. While the 2003 Provisions
define “relevant public” to include “consumers of the type of goods and/or
services to which the mark applies,” it is unclear which “consumers” need
to be considered.80 A court interpreting these definitions may determine
that “consumers” mean only actual purchasers, not potential purchasers or

77

PRC Trademark Law of 2001, supra note 52, art. 14.
Article 3 of the 2003 Provisions indicates that the following types of evidence may be used to
show that a mark is well known:
78

(1) documents concerning the degree of knowledge or recognition of the mark in the
relevant sector of the public; (2) documents concerning the duration of the use of the
mark, including those related to the history and scope of the use and the registration of
the mark; (3) documents concerning the duration, extent and geographical area of any
promotion of the mark, including the approach to, geographic area of, the type of media
for and the amount of advertisements for the promotion of the mark; (4) documents
concerning the record of successful enforcement of rights in the mark, including the
relevant documents certifying the mark in question was once protected as a well-known
mark in China or any other country/region; (5) other evidences certifying that the mark is
well-known, including, in the past three years, the outputs, sales volumes, sales incomes,
profits and taxes and sales regions etc. of the principal goods to which the mark applies.
Provisions on the Determination and Protection of Well-Known Marks (promulgated by the State Admin. for
Indus. & Commerce, Apr. 17, 2003), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=181515
(China).
79
Alexander, supra note 75, at 889.
80
See Provisions on the Determination and Protection of Well-Known Marks.
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consumers in general. For foreign trademark holders whose goods have
not entered China yet, or have not been able to reach the greater Chinese
population, such an interpretation would erect a huge evidentiary barrier for
achieving well-known status. This is especially true since Chinese courts
are least willing to look at evidence of overseas reputation.81
The Italian Ferrari Company experienced the difficulty of achieving
well-known mark status over the several years it battled a Chinese
department store that had registered Ferrari’s prancing horse design as a
trademark.82 After both the China Trademark Office and the Trademark
Review and Adjudication board rejected Ferrari’s contention that its
prancing horse mark was well known, the Italian carmaker turned to the
Chinese courts.83 Unfortunately, the Ferrari court also held that the mark
was not well known, primarily because Ferrari had failed to proffer
evidence of advertising and publicity in China.84
This difficulty of defining the “relevant public” is compounded by the
sheer geographic size of China85 as well as the huge economic
discrepancies across the country.86 Though coastal regions and major cities
have relatively advanced economies, vast regions exist where the market is
less developed and consumers have less exposure to foreign brands.87 With
these barriers to well-known status, so far only a handful of U.S.
trademarks have been deemed well known, including Disney, Wal-Mart,
Pioneer, and Barbie.88
D. The Language Barrier: Three Marks for Every Brand
The language barrier that exists between China and other countries is a
complicating factor outside of the legal framework that also frequently
comes into play.
Pfizer, Inc. hit it big with its blockbuster drug, Viagra, in the United
States and many other countries.89 As the largest pharmaceutical company

81

Alexander, supra note 75, at 895; see also Jing, supra note 9
For details of Ferrari’s “horsing saga,” see Luo & Ghosh, supra note 11, at 141–47.
83
Id. at 141–43.
84
Id.
85
China’s total area is 3,696,100 square miles, which is larger than the United States. China Quick
Facts, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, available at http://www.britannica.com/topic/111803/China-quickfacts (last visited Apr. 1, 2014); United States Quick Facts, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, available at
http://www.britannica.com/topic/616563/United-States-quick-facts (last visited Apr. 1, 2014).
86
See Richard S. Gruner, Intellectual Property in the Four Chinas, 37 INT’L L. NEWS, Spring 2008,
at 1 (arguing that the regional characteristics and business circumstances of the four regions in China
create four very different environments for IP enforcement).
87
Luo & Ghosh, supra note 11, at 147.
88
Breann M. Hill, Comment, Achieving Protection of the Well-Known Mark in China: Is There a
Lasting Solution?, 34 U. DAYTON L. REV. 281, 291 (2009).
89
The drug was an immediate success after its release in 1998, generating billions of dollars in
82
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in the world by revenue,90 there is no doubt that it has access to the best
legal and business resources to protect its intellectual property rights
around the world. Pfizer had been targeting China as a big market for
Viagra for years, illustrated by its investment of over five hundred million
dollars in the PRC for production facilities as well as the opening of a
research and development center in Shanghai.91 Ironically, however, Pfizer
does not own the most popular name for Viagra in China, Weige (伟哥),
which means “Great Older Brother,” but instead owns WaiAike (万艾可), a
transliteration of Viagra that has no meaning in Chinese and lacks the
popularity and appeal of Weige.92 Weige is owned by a Chinese
pharmaceutical company, who first registered the mark when the Chinese
media coined Viagra by that term.93 Despite many attempts to challenge
the Weige mark, Pfizer has been unsuccessful in gaining ownership of the
mark.94
Pfizer’s difficulties illustrate a method that is frequently used by
trademark squatters to infringe on a trademark owner’s rights. Because
English trademarks are commonly referred to by a Chinese transliteration,
once an unofficial Chinese-language name gains popularity, a Chinese
entity may obtain a registration for that name before the original trademark
owner can do so.95
Furthermore, due to the intricacies of the language, a single western
brand will typically have at least three marks in China: the original brand
name, the “sound-alike” version, and the definition of what the brand
means in Mandarin.96 But because there are numerous similar characters,
forms, and sounds, this creates great fodder for creative pirating.
Trademark squatters can manipulate the form, sound, or meaning of a
trademark so that they can register confusingly similar marks of their
own.97
IV. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN EFFORTS TO COMBAT
TRADEMARK SQUATTING
Though trademark squatting persists due to factors previously
discussed, new developments within the past few years signal that China is
revenue. See Daniel Chow, Lessons from Pfizer’s Disputes over Its Viagra Trademark in China, 27
MD. J. INT’L L. 82, 85 (2012).
90
John LaMattina, The Challenges in Staying #1 in Big Pharma, FORBES (July 13, 2012, 12:43
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnlamattina/2012/07/13/the-challenges-in-staying-1-in-big-pharma/.
91
Chow, supra note 89, at 83.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 87.
94
Id. at 91–92.
95
Id. at 87–88.
96
LALLEMAND, supra note 66, at 6.
97
Id.
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moving towards a more forceful legal approach against bad-faith squatters.
This part discusses recent developments within the Supreme People’s Court
of China, as well as the 2013 amendment to China’s Trademark Law.
A. The Supreme Court’s 2011 Opinions
On December 16, 2011, the Supreme People’s Court of China released
Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Giving Full Play to the
Functional Role of Intellectual Property Trials in Advancing the Great
Development and Prosperity of Socialist Culture and Promoting
Independent and Coordinated Economic Development (Opinions).98 These
Opinions included 30 specific comments covering various IP issues.99
Pertaining to trademarks, the Supreme Court emphasized, through the
Opinions, the importance of curbing bad faith registrations making
apparent that the Court is aware of this persistent issue and intends for it to
be considered more thoroughly in adjudication.100 On the issue of wellknown marks, the Opinions imply that even if there is lack of recognition
of the well-known trademark or an absence of solid evidence of bad faith,
the courts could still evaluate the similarity between squatters’ marks and
brand owners’ marks to determine if there is likelihood of confusion.101
Courts will make full use of the Trademark Law and consider reputation
and distinctiveness of trademarks, the real intention to use a trademark, and
the bad faith in trademark use to crack down on trademark squatting.102
Another promising development is the introduction of “bad faith
trademark registration” as a defense in trademark infringement cases.103
This means that when a trademark squatter brings a trademark infringement
action against the true owner of a trademark, the defendant can defend the
action by claiming the trademark requesting protection was registered in
bad faith.
Some see this as a strong message from the Supreme Court that IP
judges should take progressive approaches to stop trademark squatting

98
See Zhen Feng et al., Full Review of the Opinions from the Supreme People’s Court of China on
Giving Full Play to the Functional Role of Intellectual Property Trials (Issued Dec 2011), HOGAN
LOVELLS (April 2012), http://m.hoganlovells.com/files/Publication/0ad2c474-de2f-47ed-8825-62bb73
85cefd/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/b039ff90-91ed-437b-a925-718ace20daac/Client%20note%
20-%20New_Opinions_from_the_Supreme_People_s_Court_of_China_April_2012_%23.pdf.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
He Jing, Chinese Court Backed Up LVMH in Its Fight Against Trademark Squatters, ZY
PARTNERS LEGAL NEWSLETTER (Feb. 24, 2012), http://www.zypartners.com/zjys/blog/show_e.asp?
newsid=93.
102
Huang Hui & Yang Mingming, Trademark Squatting: Fighting Against Trademark Squatters in
China, WORLD INTELL. PROP. REV. (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.worldipreview.com/article/fightingagainst-trademark-squatters-in-china.
103
Feng et al., supra note 98.
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activities, and argue that Chinese courts have become more reasonable and
consistent in their rulings since the Opinions were issued.104 However, it
remains to be seen how strong of an influence the Opinions will have as
more lower courts interpret the Supreme Court’s guidance over the long
term.
B. 2013 Amendment of Trademark Law
It has been over ten years since the revision of Chinese Trademark
Law. Since the last revision in 2001, the country has made continuous
efforts to pass a third amendment, which would bring Chinese Trademark
Law into alignment with the Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks,
which was signed by China in 2007.105 The government has released
various drafts for public comment. The State Administration for Industry
and Commerce released the first draft for public comment in 2009,
followed by a 2011 draft by the State Council.106 The National People’s
Congress released a final draft for public comment in December of 2012,
which was finally approved on August 30, 2013.107 The new law will be
implemented on May 1, 2014.108
The third amendment makes several, significant changes to Chinese
Trademark Law. First, after the implementation of the amendment,
applicants for trademarks only need to submit one application for multiple
classes.109 This change simplifies the registration process, and prevents
enterprising trademark squatters from registering famous trademarks in
classes that the original owner did not file separate applications.
Article 7 of the amendment also introduces the principle of good faith

104
Emma Barraclough, How Supreme Court Advice is Changing Trademark Squatting in China,
222 MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 102, 102 (2012); Jing, supra note 101.
105
For example, Article 7 of the Singapore Treaty provides for multiple-class application for
trademarks. Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks, art. 7, Mar. 27, 2006, S. TREATY DOC. No. 1102.
106
Draft of Trademark Law Amendment for Public Comment, The Legislative Affairs Office of the
State Council (2011), available at http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2011-09/02/content_1939013.htm; see Paul
Ranjard, Opinion on the Third Revision of China’s Trademark Law 2012 Draft, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 30,
2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e72463b4-637b-437e-87d1-aa2a59fdedce.
107
Shangbiao Fa Xiuzheng An (Cao’an) Tiaowen (商标法修正案（草案） 条文) [Amendment
of the Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China (Draft)] (proposed by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 28, 2012), available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/lfgz/flca/201212/28/content_1749326.htm (China); Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuan Hui guanyu
Xiugai (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangbiao Fa) de Jueding, (全国人民代表大会常务委员会关
于修改《中华人民共和国商标法》的决定) [The Decision to Amend the Trademark Law of the
People’s Republic of China by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress] (Aug. 30,
2013), available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2013-08/31/content_1805119.htm [hereinafter
2013 Amendment].
108
See 2013 Amendment.
109
Id. art. 22.
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in trademark use and registration.110 The addition of good faith language
into trademark law signals a resolution to restrain bad faith trademark
squatting, because this article may be used to guard against bad faith
registrations that cannot be stopped by other specific grounds within the
law.111
Also, under the amended Article 34, if a trademark applicant has a
contract, business, or geographical relationship with the right holder of an
existent trademark, the registration can be identified and denied as
malicious squatting.112 Furthermore, registration will not be granted to
applications for trademarks imitating a registered well-known trademark in
a different classification.113
Finally, the 2013 amendment allows for a stronger protection system
for trademark owners. In calculating damages, the new law lowers the
burden of proof for the trademark owner, as it allows courts to order the
infringer to provide its accounting books and relevant materials necessary
to calculate damages.114 Statutory damages have been increased from a cap
of RMB 500,000 to RMB 3,000,000.115 The 2013 amendment also allows
punitive damages of up to 3 times normal damages, which is the first time
punitive damages have been introduced into Chinese intellectual property
laws.116
However, the amendment also included some disappointing features.
Under current law, a trademark owner can oppose an application made in
bad faith at the Chinese Trade Mark Office, and if unsuccessful it can
appeal to the Trade Mark Review and Adjudication Board and then to the
courts.117 Under the amended law, if an opposition at the Chinese Trade
Mark Office is unsuccessful, the mark is granted and the trademark owner
must then file a revocation action at the Trade Mark Review and
Adjudication Board.118 This simpler process, probably designed to deal
with the backlog at the Chinese Trade Mark Office and Trade Mark
Review and Adjudication Board, may let trademark squatters assert their
registered mark even sooner than before.119 Brand owners who have lost
their opposition filing will now face a disadvantageous situation in which a
110

Id. art. 7.
King & Wood Mallesons, Eight Key Points about the Third Amendment to the PRC Trademark
Law, MONDAQ (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.mondaq.com/x/261502/Trademark/Eight+Key+Points+
about+the+Third+Amendment+to+the+PRC+Trademark+Law.
112
2013 Amendment.
113
Id.
114
Id. art. 63.
115
Id.
116
Id.; King & Wood Mallesons, supra note 111.
117
PRC Trademark Law of 2001, supra note 52, art. 35.
118
2013 Amendment art. 35.
119
Peter Ollier, China Backs Away From Bad Faith Crackdown, MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 135,
135 (2011).
111
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squatter can obtain and hold the full registered trademark throughout the
entire invalidation process.120
C. Are These Efforts Enough?
The Opinions by the Supreme Court, as well as the 2013 amendment
to Chinese Trademark Law, are significant steps in China’s movement
towards increased protection of trademarks. However, it is unlikely that
these measures will suffice in the fight against trademark squatting.
First of all, the language barrier is a persistent issue. The linguistic
complexity of the Chinese language makes it difficult for trademark owners
to anticipate what the popular transliteration will be and therefore is a
creative heaven for trademark pirates. The language issue is an inherent
difficulty of entering the Chinese market and is best dealt with by increased
awareness and preparation by trademark owners.
Furthermore, the marginal changes in trademark law are unlikely to
prevent trademark squatting because the primary reason why squatting
persists is not a lack of law, but the lack of enforcement of the law. Even
after joining the WTO, China remained the single largest source of
counterfeit and pirated products worldwide.121 Actual enforcement of
intellectual property rights within China continued to be insufficient. In
2005, less than one percent of the total copyright and trademark cases
handled by administrative enforcement authorities were turned over to the
police for prosecution.122 It is clear that although foreign pressure on China
has been effective in promulgating modern trademark laws, the pressure
has been less successful in strengthening enforcement.123
Administrative enforcement efforts are hindered by localism, a lack of
financial resources, and the inadequacy of penalties against infringers.124
Since the central government’s decision to decentralize, local governments
rose in power and formed localized administrative bureaucracies across
China.125 This poses problems for IP enforcement as local officials,
themselves, often profit from counterfeit goods through kickbacks and
bribes.126 These local governments were also reluctant to invest the
financial resources necessary to enforce intellectual property rights, and
120
121

King & Wood Mallesons, supra note 111.
Kevin C. Lacey, China and the WTO: Targeting China’s IPR Record, 2 LANDSLIDE 33, 33

(2010).
122

Id.
See Gillian Kassner, China’s IP Reform: State Interests Align with Intellectual Property Protection
(Again), JOLT DIGEST (Apr. 24, 2012, 8:27 PM), http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/patent/chinas-ip-reformstate-interests-align-with-intellectual-property-protection-again.
124
Wong, supra note 33, at 965.
125
See Andrew Evans, Taming the Counterfeit Dragon: The WTO, TRIPS and Chinese Amendments to
Intellectual Property Laws, 31 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 587, 590–91 (2003).
126
Id at 591.
123

354

CHANG_FINAL_WEB.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

6/20/14 7:35 PM

Combating Trademark Squatting in China
34:337 (2014)

general inefficiencies of decentralized enforcement compounded into great
hindering of enforcement.127 “If administrative mechanisms of protection
were more successful . . . fewer parties would [need to] initiate legal
proceedings,” which have the added benefit of reducing the backlog in
Chinese courts.128
Similarly, though judicial enforcement has improved with the
modernization of trademark laws, it is also plagued by many problems,
including the lack of resources, difficulty in enforcing judgments,
inadequacy of penalties, and the lack of judicial independence.129 Other
speculations about reasons for China’s weak intellectual property
enforcement also point to China’s low average incomes, the country’s
position as a net importer of goods and services, and the lack of cultural
recognition of intellectual property rights.130 Clearly, simply amending
trademark laws is not a perfect solution.
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF
CHINESE TRADEMARK LAW AND ENFORCEMENT
In finding possible solutions to China’s trademark squatting problem,
it is useful to consider how other countries were able to make changes that
helped alleviate trademark squatting.
South Korea is also a first-to-file country that has “a cottage industry
of very sophisticated trademark squatters.”131 However, South Korea has
made several significant changes towards the goal of combating the issue,
which China could also implement. The Korean Intellectual Property
Office responded to trademark squatting in South Korea by “lowering the
standard for famous marks”—equivalent to “well-known marks” in
China—if “marks [have] been in use in other countries.”132 As an example
of the lowered standard for famous marks, when a South Korean company
filed and registered marks related to Häagen-Dazs—“complete with the
two As and the umlaut”—for use on handbags, the patent court sided with
the original Häagen-Dazs mark on grounds that the mark was famous in
Japan and, therefore, protected as a famous mark in South Korea.133 China
should follow South Korea’s lead by lowering the standard for well-known
127

Id.
Wong, supra note 33, at 966.
129
Id. at 667–72.
130
See Mark Liang, A Three-Pronged Approach: How the United States Can Use WTO Disclosure
Requirements to Curb Intellectual Property Infringement in China, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 285, 290–93
(2010).
131
JEROEN LALLEMAND, SPECIAL REPORT TRADEMARKS IN KOREA: BRANDING THE NEW
CULTURAL WAVE 8 (June 2012), http://trademarks.thomsonreuters.com/sites/default/files/rsrc_assets/
docs/south_korea_special_report_1.pdf.
132
Id.
133
Id. (citation omitted).
128
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marks so that use in other countries is considered.
Another significant move that South Korea made was its decision to
join the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), a treaty signed in
2006.134 The ACTA is an “initiative by key trading partners to strengthen
the international legal framework for effectively combating global
proliferation of commercial-scale counterfeiting and piracy.”135 Though
skeptics maintain that the ACTA would not have enough of an influence on
China to halt intellectual property infringement,136 by joining such
agreements, China can increase its enforcement efforts as well as signal to
the world that it is serious about combating squatters.
Lastly, what China needs in order to follow the South Korean example
is time to create homegrown intellectual property. “South Korean
companies are prolific filers of patent and trademark applications for
inventions, products, and brands,” which became a strong driving force in
the South Korean government’s push for strong intellectual property
enforcement both domestically and abroad.137 Similar to the development
that South Korea experienced a few decades ago, “China has followed the
typical pattern of a developing nation by depending heavily on foreign
investment and imported technology before being able to generate
substantial internal growth and technological advancement on its own.”138
Due to the lack of technological innovation in China, strict intellectual
property enforcement does not bring great benefit to Chinese companies,
which leads to decreased government incentive for enforcement both at
home and abroad.139 Over time, as China develops so that its domestic
innovation becomes a major driving force of the economy, there is no
doubt that the country, as a whole, will move towards increased
enforcement of intellectual property rights.

134
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), Oct. 11, 2001, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/acta (last visited Nov. 23, 2012).
135
The parties included the United States, the European Union, Switzerland, Japan, Australia, the
Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Mexico, Jordan, Morocco, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates, and
Canada. Id.
136
See, e.g., Yicun Chen, The Impact of ACTA on China’s Intellectual Property Enforcement,
NAT’L L. REV. (2012), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/impact-acta-china-s-intellectual-propertyenforcement (“[E]nforcement of the international IP agreements like ACTA is difficult for many
developing countries partly because the developed countries have set the intellectual property
standards. . . . . [S]ince China and many other developing countries lack technological innovation, the
incentives provided by intellectual property rights (for investment in research and development) are not
meaningful.”); see generally Leroy J. Pelicci Jr., China and the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement—
ACTA Faith, or ACT Futility?: An Exposition of Intellectual Property Enforcement in the Age of
Shanzhai, 1 PENN ST. J. L & INT’L AFF. 121 (2012).
137
LALLEMAND, supra note 131, at 2.
138
John R. Allison & Lianlian Lin, The Evolution of Chinese Attitudes Toward Property Rights in
Invention and Discovery, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 735, 775 (1999).
139
Chen, supra note 136.
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VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS
Though the development of Chinese Trademark Law is ongoing,
practitioners still need to operate wisely within the current legal framework
so that they can protect the intellectual property of their clients. The
following are several practical tips that every practitioner should consider
when operating under Chinese Trademark Law.
First, since there is no requirement that a trademark be in use before a
trademark application can be filed with the Trademark Office, one
important strategy that companies would be wise to follow is to file
trademark applications early, before they begin using a mark in China in
order to prevent trademark squatters.140 “The Trademark Law provides that
a trademark can be cancelled if it is not used for three consecutive years,”
but “the trademark registration process can take anywhere from [eighteen]
to [twenty-four] months or longer, meaning that the trademark applicant
may have four to five years before it is required to show it is using its
trademark or else risk cancellation of its registration.”141 Therefore, even if
a company does not have immediate plans to enter the Chinese market, if
its trademark is or is becoming well known in the United States, the
company should consider filing in advance, before trademark squatters beat
them to it.
Second, in China a mark’s sound and meaning all need to be
protected. Trademark squatters frequently infringe on a brand’s wellknown mark by manipulating the form, sound, or meaning of the marks,
which is made possible by an abundance of similar characters, forms, and
sounds in the complex Chinese language.142 Thus, trademarks best suited
for China often “convey the unique meaning of the brand without
describing it literally or copying it phonetically.”143 Furthermore, every
company trademarking in China not only needs a Chinese character name,
“but should also apply the appropriate cultural intelligence to ensure the
brand’s meaning is not lost in translation.”144 A company would not want
to discover too late that its brand did not translate well, as KFC did when
they realized that their slogan—“finger lickin’ good”—translated literally
into Chinese characters meaning “eat your fingers off.”145
Third, applicants for trademarks are advised to register their marks in
many classes, especially since this has been made easier by the new
amendment. Registration should not be limited to the precise class of
goods or services in which they plan to use a trademark, “in order to allow
140
141
142
143
144
145

Campbell & Pecht, supra note 6, at 79.
Id.
LALLEMAND, supra note 66, at 6.
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room for future expansion and to prevent consumer confusion.”146
Finally, when all else fails, brand owners who find that their mark has
already been registered have three options: pay up, wait it out and file for
cancellation for non-use, or fight it out. If a brand owner does decide to
challenge the squatter for the mark, “obtaining, preserving, and presenting
evidence in the right way is crucial.”147
VII. CONCLUSION
The new amendment to Chinese Trademark Law will be implemented
in 2014, and many are waiting to see whether the new law is a signal that
China is serious about protecting intellectual property within its borders.
Though these new developments, including the Supreme Court’s opinion in
December 2011 and the upcoming changes to Chinese Trademark Law,
look promising, these changes will likely not be enough to prevent
trademark squatters from targeting well-known foreign trademarks.
Trademark squatting is able to persist largely due to the inherent
complexity of the language as well as a lack of enforcement of existing
laws. Thus, in order to effectively combat trademark squatting, China
needs to address these underlying causes by lowering the evidentiary
standards to become a well-known mark, as well as focusing on
strengthening the enforcement of intellectual property rights. Until these
changes are made, practitioners and businesses should be aware of the
difficulties of protecting trademarks in China, and should take measures to
intelligently guard their intellectual property.
China has been taking steps to comply with international standards of
intellectual property protection, and should continue to do so, such as by
joining the ACTA. But the real thrust towards intellectual property
protection will likely come when China develops homegrown intellectual
property of its own, which will move China from being reactive to
proactive in the protection of intellectual property rights.
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